Bargaining In Diplomacy: Interrogating Elements of Capabilities and Leverages of States in The Global System

Abstract

Bargaining has long been a central feature of international diplomacy and continues to play a significant role in contemporary interstate relations. It is often assumed that powerful and economically advanced states possess inherent advantages in negotiation processes, enabling them to influence outcomes in their favor when engaging with weaker and less developed states. This assumption is historically grounded in the evolution of international relations, which has largely been shaped by power dynamics and political dominance. Traditionally, a state’s bargaining strength is associated with several factors, including geopolitical position, economic stability, military capability, and overall national influence. However, this paper critically examines whether the possession of such advantages necessarily guarantees dominance in negotiation or diminishes the bargaining capacity of weaker states. Drawing from both legal and psychological perspectives, the paper argues that successful negotiation and sustainable agreements are fundamentally dependent on mutual consent between parties, whether in domestic or international contexts. It further contends that effective bargaining is rooted in psychological principles of interaction, where the assertiveness of stronger or wealthier states does not automatically negate the negotiating power or participation of weaker or less developed states.