COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE USE OF FORCE: AN ANALYSIS OF THE EZULWINI CONSENSUS

Abstract

The failure of the League of Nations to meet its collective security obligations did not discourage the statesmen of the post second world war from giving the concept another try. Inspired by the pact of Paris of 1928 that outlawed war as an instrument of national policy, Winston Churchill, Franklin Roosevelt and other political leaders, under the aegis of the United Nations commits member states to refrain from the threat of use of force against the territorial integrity and political independence of any state. However, that declaration has four exceptions as provided in the United Nations Charter; self defense, whether individual or collective (Article 51), action against the 'enemy' states of the second World War (Germany, Italy and Japan) (Article 107), joint action by the members of the security council on behalf of the United Nations (Article 106), and other use of force authorized by the security council, including
enforcement by regional organizations (Article 53). The import of the revised version of collective security was an attempt to give the charter the wherewithal to deal decisively with threat to international peace and security. Instead of economic sanctions which were automatic in theory but discretionary in practice, the Charter gave the Security Council the right to impose non military sanctions, with all members obligated to accept and carry out the decisions of the Council. Against the background of this time-honored practices, African leaders acting under the purview of Article 13 of the United Nations Charter and Article 41 of the AU Act and joining issues with the recommendations of The High Level Panel of the Secretary General of the United Nations of 2003, revisited the concept of  Collective Security and in March 8, 2005, under the aegis of the African Union jointly took a common African position on Collective Security and the use of force, what is known today as the “Ezulwini Consensus”. This paper is a critical analysis of that consensus which is a reϔlection of the common African position on the matter. In its submission, the paper argues that though the consensus is a well-thought out idea, its implementation calls for consensus, commitment and central decision making machinery merged in a coherent and practicable Collective Security system, backed up by with a strong political will.